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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court poured-over this case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals for disposition on August 7, 1997. The Utah Supreme 
Court had jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.'A. § 78-2-2(g). The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-
3(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's 
findings that there was no verbal contract of sale between 
the Plaintiffs and the Defendants? 
2. Was the trial court correct in finding insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of partial performance by 
substantial improvements by the defendants? 
The standard of review is to give "deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact." Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942 
P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997). The standard is one of "clearly 
erroneous". The trial courts' findings are not to be disturbed 
unless the appellant can "marshal all the evidence supporting the 
findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings. Coalville City v. 
Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah.Ct.App.) (quoting Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 939 
1 
P.2d 683 (Utah 1997)." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 
P.2d 180, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
determinative in this appeal. 
S25-5-3, U.C.A. (1953) 
"Every contract for the . . . sale, of any lands, or interest 
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the . . . sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing." 
S 25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953) 
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge 
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Plaintiffs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer of real 
property based on Defendants' refusal to pay an increase in rent 
on November 1, 1996. The Defendants filed a counter-claim 
asserting an interest as purchasers in the real property pursuant 
to an alleged verbal contract. 
B. Procedural History 
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On March 11, 1997, Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants a 
3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit and Notice of Termination of 
Month-to-Month Tenancy. On March 24, 1997, the Plaintiffs served 
the Defendants with a 3-Day Summons and Eviction Notice. On 
March 26, 1997, Defendants responded to the Eviction Notice by 
filing their Answer and Counter-claim. On March 31, 1997, 
Plaintiffs filed for a Possession Bond which the court set at 
$1,500.00. On April 4, 1997, Plaintiffs replied to the Counter-
claim and mailed the Notice of Plaintiffs Possession Bond. The 
Bond had been filed on April 3, 1997. On April 10, 1997, 
Defendants demanded a hearing, which was set for April 14, 1997. 
The April 14 hearing was held to adjudicate the issue of 
possession. All parties were subject to direct, cross and 
redirect examination. The hearing was continued to April 22, 
1997. At the conclusion of the testimony, the court requested 
memoranda from both parties to address the following questions: 
1. Whether a verbal agreement to purchase land is 
enforceable under the statute of frauds; 
2. What evidence of partial performance had been 
submitted to the trial court; 
3. If an agreement to purchase the property existed, 
when were the Defendants required to exercise their 
option; 
4. If there was an agreement, whether the Defendants 
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breached that agreement by failing to purchase the real 
property within one year of possession; and 
5. If there was an agreement, what, if any, were 
Plaintiffs remedies for breach of the agreement by 
Defendants. 
On May 20, 1997, the trial court disposed of the case as 
indicated below. On May 29, 1997, Defendants requested ex parte 
a stay of the Order and Judgment and filed their Notice of 
Appeal. On June 3, 1997, the trial court published its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as its Final Order and 
Judgment. 
C. Disposition of the Case 
The Plaintiffs were granted judgment for possession and 
restitution of the property as of midnight on May 31, 1997. The 
Defendants were ordered to vacate the property by the same day. 
The trial court terminated the month-to-month lease and declared 
that any verbal option to purchase the real property which may 
have been given had expired. The trial court quieted title in 
the Plaintiffs and declared that the Defendants had no further 
rights or interest in the property. The court granted judgment 
against the Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of 
$217.80 for unpaid rent and $224.00 for Plaintiffs' court costs. 
The issues of waste and damages were reserved for further 
determination. The Plaintiffs bond was returned and the court 
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ordered that the Plaintiffs be entitled to recover any after-
accruing costs associated with the eviction and any additional 
rent accruing after May 31, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The testimony of the parties as to whether the Defendants 
were purchasing the property or merely renting was sharply 
contradictory. The Defendants testified that they had purchased 
the real property in the fall of 1987, on a verbal agreement. 
(Tr. 4/14/97, p. 59) The Plaintiffs testified that the 
Defendants were renting the property and had been given a verbal 
option to purchase the property within one year of possession. 
Plaintiffs testified that the Defendants failed to exercise that 
option. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 6-8). The Defendants attempted to 
obtain financing to purchase the property within the one year 
period but failed to obtain financing or otherwise obtain funds 
to purchase the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 70-71). 
During July of 1987, Mr. Figueroa contacted Mr. Armijo about 
renting the property. Mr. Armijo told Mr. Figueroa that he would 
rather sell the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, p. 6). The Defendants 
paid $3,000.00 as a cleaning deposit. Defendants expressed a 
willingness to purchase the property, but needed time to 
establish credit. A verbal agreement was reached to allow 
Defendants one year to obtain the necessary financing to purchase 
i 
the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, p. 8). 
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Defendants testified that on September 1, 1987, Plaintiff 
accompanied them to a meeting with the Airport Authority to 
discuss the purchase arrangements. Defendants testified that 
because the Airport Authority was convinced they were purchasing 
the property, Defendants received a check for $4,500.00. (Tr. 
4/14/97, pp. 59, 76). Plaintiff testified that at this meeting, 
no one spoke to him or explained the purpose of the meeting. (Tr. 
4/14/97, p. 19). A few days later, Defendants tendered a check 
to Plaintiffs. The Defendants testified the check was for 
$4,000.00, while the Plaintiffs testified the check was for 
$3,000.00. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 7, 61). 
After failing to obtain financing within the agreed upon 
year, Mr. Figueroa left the property and Karen Figueroa, and for 
a period of some years, had his primary residence elsewhere. 
(Tr. 4/14/97, pp.11,49,67,84-85). During this time, Mrs. 
Figueroa continued to occupy the property and pay rent. Mrs. 
Figueroa also obtained Food Stamps and other welfare assistance. 
In the course of obtaining this assistance, Mrs. Figueroa 
represented to the State that she was renting the property. (Tr. 
4/14/97, pp. 85-6). The Defendants, for some period of time 
after taking possession in 1987, purchased a renter's insurance 
policy. 
After Mr. Figueroa returned to the property, new attempts 
were made to obtain financing. (Tr. 4/14/97, p.14). Just prior 
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to the lawsuit being filed, new attempts were made to arrange for 
a purchase of the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 37-40). 
On September 30, 1996, Plaintiffs gave notice to the 
Defendants that the rent would now be increased to $450.00 per 
month effective November 1, 1996. (Tr. 4/14/97, p. 36). In 
October of 1996, the Defendants responded in a letter claiming an 
interest in the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 30-33). In November 
of 1996, Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants a 3-Day Notice to 
Pay Rent or Quit and a Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy. 
(Tr. 4/14/97, p. 35). During this time, Mr. Figueroa again 
attempted to obtain financing and purchase the property, but was 
unable to do so. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp.40-1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The burden is on the Defendants to clearly establish that 
there was a contract for the purchase of this property. Given 
the sharp contradictions in the opposing testimony, it falls to 
the trial court to weigh credibility and decide what happened and 
who to believe. The Defendants claim that they were buying the 
property for the amount of the underlying mortgage, which the 
Plaintiffs were paying and liable for. The Plaintiffs both 
testified that they were only renting the property and had given 
Defendants a one year option to obtain financing and purchase the 
property. The trial court found insufficient evidence to support 
a purchase and rejected Defendants' claim. This Court should not 
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disturb the trial court's judgment on its findings of fact and 
the credibility of the witnesses and should affirm the trial 
court's judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
THAT THERE WAS NO VERBAL CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the Defendants version of the 
trial court's findings as found in Brief of the Appellant, p. 11. 
The trial court found that, at most, Plaintiffs and Defendants 
had a verbal month-to-month rental agreement with a one year 
option to purchase the property. While Defendants claim they 
"could not find any evidence which supports the trial court's 
conclusions," (Brief of Appellant, p. 11),this was exactly both 
Plaintiffs' clear and emphatic testimony. 
B. Evidentiary Requirements to Show existence of Oral Contract to 
Purchase an Interest in Real Property. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the Defendants reading of the 
evidentiary requirements to establish an oral contract for the 
purchase of real property. Defendants specify two elements that 
are required to take an oral contract for the purchase of real 
property out of the statute of frauds: First, the terms of the 
contract must be "clear, definite, mutually understood and 
established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony." (Id., 
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p. 12); and Second, there must be some partial performance which 
"put[s] the purchaser or donee in a situation which is a fraud 
upon him unless the agreement is fully performed." 83 A.L.R.3d 
1294 (1978). After renting the property at below-market rates 
and repeatedly failing to qualify for financing, it is difficult 
to see what "fraud" requires remedy. Also, it strains the 
English language to refer to the testimony given at the hearing 
as "unequivocal". The Defendants did not meet their burden in 
establishing the existence of a contract, and did not even 
attempt to meet the burden to show any partial performance at the 
hearing. Of the four requirements of partial performance, only 
one, actual and open possession, was established at the hearing. 
The fourth requirement, that the acts relied upon be referable to 
the contract itself, is effectively refuted by Defendants own 
brief. In discussing the terms of the alleged contract, 
Defendants brief lists only three terms, the "down" payment, the 
total purchase price, and the responsibility for the taxes. 
Nowhere is there room for a reference to any acts that could be 
called part performance. Any acts relied upon by the Defendants 
are, then, not referenced to the contract. 
C. The meeting with the Salt Lake City Airport Authority is not 
Evidence as to any Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants 
On September 1, 1987, the Defendants, together with Mr. 
Armijo met with representatives of the Airport Authority. Mr. 
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Figueroa claims he told the Airport Authority that he was 
purchasing the property. However, this has not been 
substantiated in any way and only goes, at most, to Mr. 
Figeuroas' state of mind. Mr. Armijo testified that he didn't 
even know why he was there (other than Mr. Figueroa was going to 
get some money) and was not involved in nor heard any discussion 
regarding a purchase of the property. 
D. Mr. Armijo's Testimony does not support the Existence of an 
Oral Contract for the Sale of the Real Property. 
Defendants point in their brief to testimony allegedly 
supporting their contention of the existence of an oral contract. 
When asked what would be required to move in, Mr. Armijo stated, 
"all I want is a cleaning charge." He also testified to saying 
"If you decide to buy it, that will go down on the payment." (Tr. 
4/14/97, p. 7)( Italics added). The cleaning deposit was to have 
been converted into a down payment and be an addition to the 
purchase price had the Defendants been able to arrange financing 
and exercise their option to purchase. They did not, and the 
cleaning deposit remained a cleaning deposit. The Defendants 
testified that the deposit was always a "down" payment. For 
Defendants to point to this contradictory testimony and claim 
that the terms were "mutually understood", defies logic. 
Mrs. Armijo affirmed the testimony of Mr. Armijo regarding 
what the partie's agreement was and further testified that she 
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had wanted to evict Karen Figueroa after Mr. Figueroa had left 
her and she was behind in her rent, but that Mr. Armijo felt 
sorry for her and wouldn't start eviction procedures at that 
time. 
E. Payment of the Cleaning Deposit was Acceptance of the Offer to 
Lease, but could not be an Acceptance of the Offer to Sell 
without meeting the other Terms required by Plaintiffs. 
It is not in dispute that a payment was received by the 
Plaintiffs prior to the Defendants taking possession. What is in 
dispute is the meaning to be given that payment. Plaintiffs 
testified that it was a cleaning deposit, and Defendants 
testified that it was a down payment. The trial court, as judge 
of credibility, decided in favor of the Plaintiffs, and without 
more than the Defendants contrary testimony, this Court should 
not disturb that finding. The testimony of Mr. Armijo alluded to 
by the Defendants in their brief clearly indicates that the 
deposit was to be converted to a down payment after the 
Defendants arranged financing. 
F. The Purchase Price in Plaintiffs' Offer is Clear and Definite. 
This is not in dispute. The offered price was always 
whatever was sufficient to buy out the Plaintiffs mortgage plus 
the cleaning deposit. The Defendants were never able to obtain 
financing and exercise their option to buy out the Plaintiffs. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE BY 
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SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
The purpose of the statute of frauds is to protect and 
preserve property rights and to avoid disputes over title to real 
property. To take an oral contract out of the statute of frauds, 
the contract must be clear, definite and mutually understood. 
There is virtually nothing in this case that can be said to be 
"mutually understood" by the parties. After proving the 
existence of a contract (which has not been done in this case), 
the party seeking to rely on the agreement, must then show acts 
of partial performance. There are four requirements. There must 
be acts of substantial or valuable improvements, the giving of 
valuable consideration, actual and open possession, and the acts 
relied upon must be referable to the contract. Holmgren 
Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P. 2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975). 
No evidence was submitted to the trial court on the issue of 
improvements completed by the Defendants. It is now too late to 
introduce any evidence to support this claim. The issue of these 
improvements was not before the court, and can not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. To the contrary, Plaintiffs testimony 
was that the property was "literally run down," and Plaintiffs 
"were afraid that the board of health would close it down." (Tr. 
4/14/97, p. 12). Mrs. Armijo testified that the property was 
"run down" and "in need of painting and stuff like that." (Tr. 
4/14/97, p.52). This testimony was not contradicted by the 
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Defendants. 
The second requirement is for valuable consideration. The 
uncontradicted testimony at the hearing was that the payment was 
at below-market value and the Defendants did not keep current on 
paying the taxes as agreed they had agreed as part of the rental 
terms. 
The third requirement of actual and open possession has 
never been in dispute. 
The fourth requirement that the acts relied upon must be 
referable to the contract, is refuted by the Defendants. Their 
testimony that they made improvements was not only insufficient, 
not credible and disputed by Plaintiffs, but any such alleged 
improvements are not referable to the alleged contract and could 
not, in any event, be deemed as partial performance thereunder. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants did not establish the existence of an oral 
contract for the sale of the property. There was no meeting of 
the minds. The terms as understood by the Defendants are 
completely inconsistent with the terms as understood by the 
Plaintiffs. No agreement was reached, and therefore no contract 
was made. This case is a textbook example of the purpose of the 
statute of frauds. The court found at most, that there was a 
verbal rental agreement with a verbal one year option to purchase 
that was never exercised. These findings are not only supported 
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by substantial evidence but by the more credible evidence and by 
common sense. The trial court had sufficient opportunity and 
reason to judge the credibility of the Defendants and disbelieve 
their testimony. Karen Figueroas' acknowledgment that she 
represented to the State of Utah that she was renting and Mr. 
Figueroas' ultimate acknowledgment that he was involved with 
another woman and had left the property and not resided there for 
a couple of years (after initial denials by both Defendants on 
that issue) alone clearly points Defendants' lack of credibility. 
The record is replete with testimony by both Plaintiffs and other 
evidence supporting all the court's findings of fact and because 
the evidence clearly supports its findings, the trial court's 
judgment should not be disturbed, but affirmed. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiffs pray for an affirmation of the 
trail court's order and judgment and an order dismissing the 
Defendants' appeal with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^^day of November, 1997 
Stephen B. Watkins, #3400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellees 
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Telephone: (801) 355-2886 
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